Citation

Weigand F. LSE Public Policy Rev. 2022; 2(3): e5.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, LSE Press)

DOI

10.31389/lseppr.54

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The paper explores the long-term developments and dynamics in Afghanistan, which enabled the Taliban to capture the state in August 2021. It suggests that the Taliban's success was enabled by the failure of the international intervention to build legitimate authority in Afghanistan. Three factors contributed to this failure: First, different actors that were part of the intervention in the country pursued competing agendas, especially with the 'War on Terror' undermining human rights and state-building. Second, a gap between the Afghan internationally supported state and its citizens evolved and grew larger over time, especially due to the risk mitigation measures applied. Third, day-to-day interactions that ordinary people in Afghanistan had with the state were often perceived as corrupt and extractive, making it difficult for the state to convey that it was working in the interest of its citizens.

Keywords: Celebratory Gunfire

Language: en

Keywords

authority; legitimacy; statebuilding; Taliban; war on terror