Citation

Katagiri N. Small Wars Insurg. 2011; 22(1): 170-195.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/09592318.2011.546610

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The strategy of 'winning hearts and minds' is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency.

Language: en

Keywords

counterinsurgency; decolonization; Gerald Templer; guerrilla war; the Malayan Emergency; winning hearts and minds