Citation

Schwarze R, Croonenbroeck C. Econ. Disaster Clim. Chang. 2017; 1(2): 167-178.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, Springer International)

DOI

10.1007/s41885-017-0014-1

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In this paper we discuss the impact of prevention programmes Swiss property insurers undertake to reduce damage claims. While the cantonal public law insurer KGV tends to spend notable amounts of money on prevention programmes to avoid or decrease damage due to natural hazard, the private insurers in the so-called GUSTAVO cantons rather do not. We investigate the interaction of prevention spending, claims and premiums in the KGV system. Furthermore, for the KGV system, we check the causality direction of influence of prevention on the claims and find that increases in damage cause increased prevention. This may seem counterintuitive at first glance, but can be explained by political pressure on public insurers caused by increasing damages of natural hazards.

Language: en