Citation

Biedermann A, Bozza S, Taroni F, Aitken C. Sci. Justice 2017; 57(1): 80-85.

Affiliation

University of Edinburgh, School of Mathematics and Maxwell Institute, Edinburgh, EH9 3FD, Scotland.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, Forensic Science Society, Publisher Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.scijus.2016.10.005

PMID

28063592

Abstract

In this paper we reiterate that the personalist interpretation of probability is inevitable and as least as informed as any other allegedly more 'objective' definition of probability. We also argue that the problem faced by forensic scientists, the reporting on imperfect personal knowledge, in terms of probabilities, can be reconstructed as a decision problem. Tackling this problem through a rigorous decision theoretic analysis provides further argument in support of the view that optimal probability reporting is in terms of single numbers, not intervals.

Copyright © 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.. All rights reserved.

Language: en