Citation

Lahiri S, Self S. Rev. Dev. Econ. 2007; 11(4): 591-606.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1467-9361.2007.00387.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

We analyze gender bias in school enrollment by developing a two-period model where women become part of extended families of their in-laws. Each family decides how many sons and daughters are sent to school and thus become skilled. Gender bias occurs due to failure of the families to internalize inter-household externalities. "Groom-specific" dowry worsens the situation. Under "bride-specific" dowry, bias exists if and only if the skill premium in the labor market is bigger than that in the marriage market. A specific discriminatory "food-for-education" policy is shown to reduce bias, but increase total enrollment.

Language: en