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Citation |
Peleg B, Sudhölter P, Zarzuelo JM. SERIEs 2011; 3(1-2): 143-156. |
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Copyright |
(Copyright © 2011, Spanish Economic Association, Publisher Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group) |
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DOI |
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PMID |
unavailable |
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Abstract |
On several classes of n-person NTU games that have at least one Shapley NTU value, Aumann characterized this solution by six axioms: Non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Each of the first five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms, and the logical independence of IIA is an open problem. We show that for n = 2 the first five axioms already characterize the Shapley NTU value, provided that the class of games is not further restricted. Moreover, we present an example of a solution that satisfies the first five axioms and violates IIA for two-person NTU games (N, V) with uniformly p-smooth V(N). |