Citation

Chalk P. Aust. J. Polit. Hist. 1998; 44(3): 373-388.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1998, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/1467-8497.00027

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

When dealing with terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy, it is a common assumption that it is the terrorists — who by definition refuse the rules of the liberal democratic “game”— who pose the greatest threat to the underlying principles and freedoms that are enshrined in this form of political life. However, in instances where the state fails to ensure that its response to terrorism is limited, well-defined and controlled, it is likely that institutionalised counter-terrorist policies will pose an even greater threat to the political and civil traditions that are central to the liberal democratic way of life. This paper demonstrates the potential danger by examining three cases when counter-terrorist policies initiated by (supposedly) liberal democratic entities came dangerously close to transplanting subversive terror from “below” with institutionalised, bureaucratised terror from “above”: the “strategy of tension” initiated in Italy between 1969 and 1974; the Spanish “dirty war” against ETA between 1983 and 1987; and the abandonment of democratic rule in Peru between 1992 and 1996. The paper concludes that ultimately the effectiveness of the liberal democratic state's response to terrorism depends on its acceptability. It is therefore paramount that any solution which is initiated is made with due regard to the long term impact that it will have on the wider process of liberal democratic life.