Citation

Addison T, Murshed SM. Def. Peace Econ. 2005; 16(2): 69-82.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2005, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690500070078

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three-way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep-seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.