Citation

Hausken K. Def. Peace Econ. 2006; 17(6): 589-603.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690601025492

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In Hirshleifer's (1995) model for unitary actors, combined fighting/production abruptly breaks down when inter-group decisiveness of fighting is above a certain value (above one) or income requirements are not met. Accounting for the collective action problem, this article gives the opposite result that fighting/production is stable also for large decisiveness parameters (above one) and strict income requirements for each agent. The stable fighting/production equilibrium gets gradually easier to perturb off balance for high inter-group decisiveness, high costs of fighting, different fighting efficiencies, and equal group sizes. The equilibrium number of groups that can be sustained decreases in the inter-group decisiveness and increases in the cost of fighting.