Citation

Linster BG, Fullerton RL, McKee M, Slate S. Def. Peace Econ. 2001; 12(4): 285-302.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2001, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10430710108404989

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper experimentally tests a number of hypotheses that follow from models of international competition that are based on Tullock style rent-seeking models. Specifically, we designed and performed experiments to see how variations in the degree of publicness in the prize as well as changes in the values assigned to the prize affect alliances in terms of individual nation contributions, total contributions, burden sharing, and the likelihood of winning the prize. While there was substantial variation in individual behavior, the results of the experiments generally conform to the theoretical predictions of the rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances.