Citation

Levy A, Faria JR. Def. Peace Econ. 2007; 18(4): 339-352.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/10242690600951698

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Ramsey's model is extended to three possible scenarios of conflicts in dual-population lands: partition, federation and civil war. The federally utility-maximizing consumption-growth rate in a strictly political federation might be lower than that under partition for the wealthier and more slowly multiplying group. This group may benefit from joining a federation that facilitates technological transfer and from obeying the federal no-arbitrage rule as long as its own technology is inferior to the hybrid. The utility-maximizing consumption growth rate for a group engaged in a civil war is larger than those under partition and a strictly political federation if its rival's warfare is mainly aimed at inflicting casualties and is likely to be smaller when its rival's warfare is mainly sabotage.