Citation

Klotz L. Biosecur. Bioterror. 2007; 5(4): 313-8; discussion 353-7.

Affiliation

Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Lynnklotz@cs.com

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Mary Ann Liebert Publishers)

DOI

10.1089/bsp.2007.0026

PMID

18081491

Abstract

Among potential bioweapons attacks, endemic infectious diseases (that is, those naturally occurring diseases that afflict us every year), and a potential influenza pandemic, how should we apportion funding and resources for basic research and countermeasure development? To address this question, I argue for a "combined risk assessment" that considers bioweapons attacks with natural pandemics and endemic infectious disease. At present, risk assessments for bioweapons attacks are carried out separately from the assessments long carried out for endemic infectious diseases to make public health and medical care decisions. One result of this separation is that funding decisions may be unduly influenced by an overblown fear of a big bioweapons attack and by political whim. The result of the simplified combined risk assessment presented here argues for more funding and resources for endemic infectious disease and for placing biodefense against anthrax and other bioweapons in a place lower in the risk hierarchy. Since the assessment here considers only fatalities to make the point that our priorities are skewed, the conclusions are only a "first word" on the subject, far from the last. Furthermore, the impact of other issues on priorities, such as national and international policy, is not considered. It is a call for a debate on the public stage of the policy and other rationale and the quantitative risk assessment arguments that now place bioweapons attacks at the top of our risk ranking.

Language: en