Citation

Yamauchi A, Tanimoto J, Hagishima A, Sagara H. Phys. Rev. E Stat. Nonlin. Soft Matter Phys. 2009; 79(3 Pt 2): 036104.

Affiliation

Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, American Physical Society, Publisher American Institute of Physics)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

19392015

Abstract

Using a cellular automaton traffic model based on the stochastic optimal velocity model with appropriate assumptions for both incoming and outgoing vehicle boundaries, the so-called bottleneck issue on a lane-closing section was investigated in terms of game theory. In the system, two classified driver agents coexist: C agents (cooperative strategy) always driving in the first lane and D agents (defective strategy) trying to drive in a lower-density lane whether the first or the second lane. In high-density flow, D agents' interruption into the first lane from the second just before the lane-closing section creates a heavier traffic jam, which reduces social efficiency. This particular event can be described with a prisoner's dilemma game structure.

Language: en