Citation

den Hartogh G. Med. Health Care Philos. 2018; 21(3): 403-410.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s11019-017-9815-9

PMID

29189943

PMCID

PMC6096507

Abstract

It has been proposed that an old and ill person may have a 'duty to die', i.e. to refuse life-saving treatment or to end her own life, when she is dependent on the care of intimates and the burdens of care are becoming too heavy for them. In this paper I argue for three contentions: (1) You cannot have a strict duty to die, correlating to a claim-right of your relatives, because if they reach the point at which the burdens of care are larger than you can reasonably expect them to take, the natural conclusion is that their duty ends. (2) They may be prepared, however, to go on caring for you beyond that point. In that case your responsibility for their wellbeing may require you to refuse this care, even if this results in a situation for you in which death will be preferable to continued life. (3) If this is the correct understanding of your responsibilities, the objection that in the context of family life the burdens of care attached to one family member's valued existence can never be 'too heavy', fails. It postulates unlimited concern on one side and a total lack of concern on the other.

Language: en

Keywords

Humans; Family; Caregivers; Netherlands; Terminal Care; Altruistic suicide; Duty to die; Health Expenditures; Philosophy, Medical; Burdens of care; Obligations of family members; Reception of care