Citation

Hamblin-Yule C. Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review 2022; 61(3): 431-450.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022)

DOI

10.1017/S0012217322000361

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Immanuel Kant maintained throughout his life that non-human persons likely exist but he failed to specify how we could recognise them. In this article, I argue (a) that non-human organisms can be considered non-human persons if they can be judged as belonging to a species with a moral vocation, and (b) a species can be judged as having a moral vocation if at least one of its members is able to make what I will call a moral sacrifice in which that member sacrifices its physical life for the sake of its moral life. © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Canadian Philosophical Association/Publié par Cambridge University Press au nom de l'Association canadienne de philosophie.

Language: en

Keywords

suicide; ethics; recognition; Immanuel Kant; sacrifice; non-human persons