Citation

Tomás-Valiente Lanuza C. Revista Espanola de Derecho Constitucional 2019; 2019(116): 301-328.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2019)

DOI

10.18042/cepc/redc.116.10

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Two recent 2017 decisions of Colombia's Constitutional Court have widened the scope of the right to euthanasia, first declared by the Court in its 1997 ruling. From its initial configuration as a fundamental liberty right, based upon the dignity/autonomy of terminally ill, competent patients, it has come to be attributed (on the basis of an idea of dignity centered on the avoidance of suffering and not so much on the autonomy notions of the first decision) to terminally ill and seriously suffering girls, boys and teenagers (which means that in cases of their complete lack of competence the right is exercised by their parents). This paper analyses the core of this jurisprudence and highlights (in addition to the need to distinguish between competent and non-competent patients when discussing "good death" matters) what is considered a questionable use of the labile concept of dignity as a parameter for judging the constitutionality of laws. © 2019, Centro Estudios Politicos Constitucionales. All rights reserved.

Language: es

Keywords

Euthanasia; Right to die; Autonomy; Dignity; Assisted-suicide