Citation

de Campos TC. Journal of Disability and Religion 2018; 22(3): 246-265.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2018)

DOI

10.1080/23312521.2018.1486775

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Both Carter and Bill C-14 provide an interpretation of human dignity linked to and dependent on autonomy. By relating human dignity to autonomy, the Supreme Court of Canada and the Canadian Federal Government seem to support an anthropological view of dignity centered on the idea of the homo economicus. However, this is not the only view of human dignity. The author argues that a better (i.e., more pluralistic and inclusive) anthropological view of human dignity should capture the diversity of persons and the richness of the human life in a more integral way, without excluding those people who do not meet the homo economicus standards. Specifically, the author discusses the Personalist view of human dignity, according to which human dignity is (a) intrinsic to every human being, simply in virtue of their humanity, and therefore (b) not lost when autonomy is gone. The author discusses the Personalist view of human dignity and juxtaposes it against the homo economicus view, to show the inclusiveness of the former and the shortcomings of the latter. By closely examining the Personalist view of human dignity, the author dispels the claims that human dignity can ever be lost and be restored by euthanasia and assisted suicide--claims that stem from both Carter's and Bill C-14's interpretations of dignity. © 2019, © 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Language: en

Keywords

autonomy; human dignity; suffering; assisted suicide/euthanasia; Bill C-14; Carter v Canada; homo economicus; MAiD; mental health disabilities; personalism