Citation

Anderson J. Ethical Theory Moral Pract. 2014; 17(3): 355-368.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2014, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s10677-013-9448-x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Like being able to drive a car, being autonomous is a socially attributed, claimed, and contested status. Normative debates about criteria for autonomy (and what autonomy entitles one to) are best understood, not as debates about what autonomy, at core, really is, but rather as debates about the relative merits of various possible packages of thresholds, entitlements, regulations, values, and institutions. Within different "regimes" of autonomy, different criteria for (degrees of) autonomy become authoritative. Neoliberal, solidaristic, and perfectionist regimes entail conflicting understandings of what gets you autonomy and what autonomy gets you-for example, in relation to policies regarding physician-assisted suicide or financial support for senior citizens. In light of this, justifying a particular understanding of autonomy is inseparable from the task of arguing for the context-specific merits of a regime of autonomy as a whole and in relation to other ethical and political commitments. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.

Language: en

Keywords

Paternalism; Physician-assisted suicide; Perfectionism; Autonomy; Competency; Pragmatism; Neoliberalism; Ascriptivism; Pension policy; Solidarism