Citation

Coggon J. Oxf. J. Legal Stud. 2013; 33(2): 401-419.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Oxford University Press)

DOI

10.1093/ojls/gqs030

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In their book Debating Euthanasia, Emily Jackson and John Keown present respectively arguments in favour of and against the legalization of (some instances of) euthanasia and assisted suicide. Jackson advances a case based on a principled commitment to a secular, liberal legal system, arguing that obligations rooted in compassion require the careful development of laws to permit assisted dying. Keown defends the status quo, arguing that the law ought to sustain a prohibition against assisted dying, both out of a principled commitment to the inviolability of life doctrine, and because satisfactory regulation will be impossible to draft. I question the strength of each author's essay. Jackson, I argue, does not take sufficiently seriously the plausibility of secular moral objections to assisted dying. Keown, meanwhile, overstates the inviolability principle's place in English law. Focusing particularly on Keown's essay, I go on to consider the approach taken to 'debating euthanasia', and suggest that it betrays more about the direction of the public debate, and the fragility of 'the case against', than he would perhaps wish. © The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Language: en

Keywords

Euthanasia; Assisted suicide; Law and ethics; Assisted dying