Citation

Varelius J. Neuroethics 2013; 6(1): 85-95.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s12152-011-9147-z

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In a recent issue of Neuroethics, I considered whether the notion of human dignity could help us in solving the moral problems the advent of the diagnostic category of minimally conscious state (MCS) has brought forth. I argued that there is no adequate account of what justifies bestowing all MCS patients with the special worth referred to as human dignity. Therefore, I concluded, unless that difficulty can be solved we should resort to other values than human dignity in addressing the moral problems MCS poses. In his new book Christopher Kaczor criticizes the argument I put forward. Below, I respond to Kaczor's criticism. I maintain that the considerations he presents do not undermine my argument nor succeed in providing adequate justification for the view that all MCS patients possess the worth referred to as human dignity. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.

Language: en

Keywords

human; racism; morality; assisted suicide; medical ethics; review; euthanasia; priority journal; patient right; terminal care; nonhuman; defense mechanism; human dignity; sexism; Human dignity; Kaczor; minimally conscious state; Minimally conscious state; species difference; Speciesism; Varelius