Citation

Stark F. Crim. Law Rev. 2013; 2013: 949-965.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2013, Thompson Reutere: Sweet and Maxwell)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article analyses the argument in R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice that a doctor who, in certain circumstances, killed a willing patient would have a defence of "necessity" to a count of murder or assisted suicide. It contends that, given the uncertainty surrounding the term "necessity" in English criminal law, this argument might be read in a number of ways. None of these interpretations suits the circumstances of Nicklinson. It will be concluded that consent would have been a better basis for the applicant's argument, although such an approach would have been similarly doomed to fail. © 2014 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited.

Language: en

Keywords

Physician-assisted suicide; Murder; Doctors; Consent; Necessity; Defences