Citation

Azam JP. Public Choice 2012; 153(3-4): 357-373.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2012, Holtzbrinck Springer Nature Publishing Group)

DOI

10.1007/s11127-011-9798-7

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper tries to reconcile the observed fact that suicide-terrorists have a relatively high education level with rationality. It brings out the conditions under which potential students choose to acquire some education in a rational-choice model where this yields a non-zero probability of blowing up the resulting human capital in a terrorist attack. The comparative-statics of the rational expectations equilibrium of this model demonstrate how economic development, on the one hand, and repression, on the other hand, might reduce terrorism under some parameter restrictions. © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

Language: en

Keywords

Education; Terrorism; Development