Citation

Hříbek T. Filosoficky Casopis 2011; 59(6): 909-929.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The article is a reply to three critics of a previous piece on the ethics of euthanasia in which I defended physician-assisted suicide. According to Ingrid Strobachová it is necessary to give greater attention to the significance of pain, which, she claims, may benefit from a phenomenological description. According to Marta Vlasáková my argument is not valid because two principles on which it is founded - i.e. the conception of life as of fundamental value and the autonomy of the patient - are not in mutual harmony. Jakub Jirsa criticises the very concept of assisted suicide and the moral legitimacy and need for the legalisation of assisted suicide. To Dr Strobachová I reply that phenomenological description is as an acceptable method as any other - as long, that is, as it is not only a verbal game, but constitutes a real source of knowledge. In response to Dr Vlasá ková I argue that a more charitable reading of my argument is possible. The arguments of Dr Jirsa against assisted suicide are beset with various inconsistencies, including the fact that he himself allows that doctors should tolerate suicide by the refusal of food and drink. Such an act does not, however, differ in any relevant way from physician-assisted suicide.

Language: cs