Citation

McGee A. Legal Stud. 2011; 31(3): 467-491.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2011, Society of Legal Scholars, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/j.1748-121X.2011.00193.x

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of-life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other. © 2011 The Author. Legal Studies © 2011 The Society of Legal Scholars.

Language: en