Citation

Gunaratna R. J. Polic. Intell. Count. Terror. 2008; 3(2): 99-116.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, Publisher Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/18335300.2008.9686916

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Until recently, the Islamabad Marriott Hotel was arguably the most protected hotel in the world. Targeted twice previously by terrorists - in October 2004 and January 2007 - it had in place multiple physical target hardening measures as well as a well-trained security staff. But on 20 September 2008, these measures were no match for a massive truck bomb that, while stopped from entering the hotel premises, somehow still triggered a fire that engulfed the hotel and burnt for two days. No group has yet claimed responsibility for the attack although explosives experts believe the modus operandi bears resemblance to the attacks on the Danish Embassy in Islamabad, the FIA building in Lahore, Hamza camp and the Pakistan Air Force base in Saragodha. The June 2008 suicide attack on the Danish Embassy has been claimed by al-Qaeda, which recently released the martyrdom video of the Saudi suicide bomber "Abu Ghareeb al-Makki" (a.k.a. Kamaal al-Hadhli). This case study raises two important questions for hotel security that are just as applicable outside Pakistan:. 1. How was it possible for a truck containing 600 kg of explosives to enter a sensitive 1 km city zone that includes the Prime Minister's residence, the Presidential office and the Supreme Court? Once the truck bomb was on the road to the Marriott Hotel, the only thing stopping it from reaching its target were the physical barriers at the hotel gate. Fortunately the multiple layers of protection worked, but at the cost of the lives of the security guards manning them. 2. What more can a hotel do to enhance security without compromising its basic function - to encourage the public to enter its premises? If it is a question of when, and not if, hotels succumb to terrorist attacks, how prepared are they to mitigate the consequences of an attack? A paradigm shift in response strategy, moving beyond perimeter security to include consequence management, is clearly required. © 2008 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.

Language: en