Citation

Berman E, Laitin DD. J. Public Econ. 2008; 92(10-11): 1942-1967.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.jpubeco.2008.03.007

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Can rational models, once theological explanations are discredited, explain why certain radical religious rebels are so successful in perpetrating suicide attacks? The fundamental barrier to success turns out not to be recruiting suicide attackers; there is a rational basis for volunteering. Rather, the barrier is the danger of other operatives defecting. A club model, portraying voluntary religious organizations as efficient providers of local public goods, explains how they weed out potential defectors by requiring sacrifices as signals of commitment. They are thereby able to succeed in risky terrorist attacks. The model has testable implications for tactic choice and damage achieved by clubs and other rebel organizations. Data spanning a half-century on both terrorists and civil war insurgents, much from Middle East sources and Israel/Palestine, reveal that: a) missions organized by radical religious clubs that provide benign local public goods are both more lethal and are more likely to be suicide attacks than missions organized by other terrorist groups with similar aims and theologies; and b) suicide attacks are chosen when targets are "hard," i.e., difficult to destroy. Our results suggest benign tactics to counter radical religious terrorism and insurgency. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Language: en

Keywords

Terrorism; Middle East; Suicide attacks; Sects; Insurgency; Club goods; Development economics; Economics of religion; Public goods