Citation

Wells L, Horowitz BM. J. Homeland Secur. Emerg. Manage. 2007; 4(2).

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Walter de Gruyter)

DOI

10.2202/1547-7355.1232

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Terrorist organizations are often difficult for policy makers to understand, a circumstance that is exacerbated when there is little consensus amongst the community of experts. This research presents a controlled way to prioritize differing explanations about terrorist organizations. As a case study we examine the preferences of the organization Hamas when recruiting suicide attackers. Using two different data sets, one collected from past suicide attacker biographies, the other a survey of subject matter experts, we prioritized ten categories of theories of recruitment in the West Bank from 2001-2005. Based on our analysis, the four factors found to be most important are, in no order of importance: religious influences, individual frustrations, personal economic motivations and political/nationalistic motivations. In contrast, the six factors which are least important are: cultural motivations, personal revenge motivations, social network enablers, operational usefulness to the organization, small group dynamics and internal psychological disorders. To minimize Hamas's recruitment effectiveness, countermeasures which align with the important factors will be more effective than those that do not. Copyright © 2007 The Berkeley Electronic Press. All rights reserved.

Language: en

Keywords

Terrorism; Suicide terrorism; Information sharing and collaboration; Multiple competing hypotheses