Citation

Kennedy-Pipe C, Vickers R. Rev. Int. Stud. 2007; 33(2): 205-221.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Cambridge University Press)

DOI

10.1017/S0260210507007474

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

As debate continues over the conduct, the legality and the morality of the war in Iraq, this article addresses how and why Prime Minister Blair decided on the British road to war in Iraq. The article argues that Tony Blair was working within a mindset at. both the domestic and international levels that meant, he was predisposed to use military force against Iraq and indeed against other perceived threats to the West. His mindset arose, we will argue, through fear rather than arrogance, through the experiences of the past two decades as much as contemporary events, and this meant that he systematically over-estimated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. We postulate that Blair was not pressured into invading Iraq by President. Bush. Rather, he believed that it. was the right path for Britain to take, and that, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein was actually the logical outcome of the 'Doctrine of the International Community' outlined In his Chicago speech in 1999. We go on to make the claim that by concentrating on supporting the United States in its grand strategy, Tony Blair misunderstood the pattern of politics at home and perhaps more seriously of the 'threat' to the domestic security of the United Kingdom. This was not a danger from Iraqi WMD or even from 'foreign' terrorists as had happened on 9/11 but from home-grown suicide bombers, some of whom claimed to be inspired by opposition to Blair's wars. This was the blowback that mattered - and will continue to do so - for the UK.

Language: en