Citation

Sandler T. World Econ. 2003; 26(6): 779-802.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2003, John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

10.1111/1467-9701.00548

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the nature of transnational terrorism and some of the collective action issues that it poses in the aftermath of 9/11. In particular, rationality is investigated from alternative viewpoints that include the terrorist group's leaders, suicide bombers, and the targeted government. Additional difficulties, associated with the deterrence and pre-emption dilemmas of targeted governments, are discussed. These governments' cooperative failures are shown to play into the hands of networked terrorists, who utilise their collective strengths to augment these governments' inadequate and non-cooperative responses. Other collective action failures on the part of governments that involve intelligence and duplication of efforts are investigated. Another purpose is to identify what works and what does not against terrorism. Finally, the costs of terrorism are addressed for a globalising society.

Language: en