Citation

Grey J. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 2017; 25(2): 380-388.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017)

DOI

10.1080/09608788.2016.1230539

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Steven Nadler has argued that Spinoza can, should, and does allow for the possibility of suicide committed as a free and rational action. Given that the conatus is a striving for perfection, Nadler argues, there are cases in which reason guides a person to end her life based on the principle of preferring the lesser evil. If so, Spinoza's disparaging statements about suicide are intended to apply only to some cases, whereas in others (such as the case of Seneca) he would grant that suicide is dictated by reason. Here, I object to Nadler's interpretation by showing that it conflicts with Spinoza's metaphysical psychology. Even given Nadler's interpretation of the conatus doctrine, the possibility that reason could guide a person to commit suicide is incompatible with the conatus of the mind. Spinoza holds that the mind cannot contain an adequate idea 'that excludes the existence of our body' (E3p10). Yet, as I argue, in order for reason to guide a person voluntarily to end her life, she would need to have an adequate idea representing her death-an idea that excludes the existence of her body. For this reason, Spinoza's system rules out the possibility of rational suicide. © 2016 BSHP.

Language: en

Keywords

ethics; free man; metaphysics; reason; Spinoza; suicide