Citation

Reed-Berendt R, Clough B. Int. J. Law Psychiatry 2024; 93: e101960.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2024, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ijlp.2024.101960

PMID

38354466

Abstract

In this article, we consider the approach to decisions regarding capacity and sexual relations in the Court of Protection in England and Wales, and the boundaries drawn through its application of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (MCA). We discuss recent developments in the law following the UK Supreme Court case A Local Authority v JB [2021] UKSC 52, which recast how capacity in relation to sexual relations ought to be assessed. Noting that this case has been warmly received by some feminist theorists for the centrality it affords to mutual consent, we draw on critical approaches from feminist, Black feminist, and disability scholarship, to call attention to the legal techniques and judicial reasoning in this case and the ways in which this embeds problematic norms and reinforces the marginalisation of disabled people. We call attention to the impoverished notions of equality advanced in the case and the assumptions that this appears to rely upon which obscure the realities and histories of legal intervention in disabled people's lives. We further argue that the approach in sexual relations cases appears to use capacity determinations as a vehicle to supplement gaps left by the criminal law, blurring their distinct rationalities and enabling further opportunities for control. We suggest that important insights can be gained from bringing these critical perspectives into conversation, including unsettling assumptions contained in the judgment and in mental capacity scholarship more broadly, manoeuvring us out of the perceived intractability of legal reasoning in this context, and offering productive ways forward.

Language: en

Keywords

Consent to sex; Disability; Equality; Feminism; Mental capacity law; UNCRPD