Citation

Shen H, Zhao S. Transp. Saf. Environ. 2024; 6(1): tdac074.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2024, Oxford University Press)

DOI

10.1093/tse/tdac074

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This study is carried out to promote the precise supervision of dangerous goods transportation training, improve the efficiency of civil aviation supervision and further ensure the safety of air transportation. First, from the perspective of behaviour interaction and interest demands, evolutionary game theory is used to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of dangerous goods transportation training institutions, the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) and the public. Then, the evolutionary game equilibrium of the system is further analysed under the joint action of the three parties. Finally, the influences of important parameters of the model on the behavioural strategy selection of the three parties are investigated via MATLAB numerical simulation. The conclusions reveal that the system has three evolutionarily stable strategies under different parameters, namely (non-compliant training, supervision, non-participation in supervision), (non-compliant training, supervision, participation in supervision) and (compliant training, supervision, non-participation in supervision). Moreover, the CAAC supervision cost, the fine amount, the supervision cost of public participation, the supervision success rate and the reporting reward amount are the main parameters that affect the behavioural strategy selection of the tripartite game players. The conclusions and suggestions of this study provide a decision-making basis and guidance for the supervision and management of civil aviation dangerous goods transportation training.

Language: en