Citation

Rui R, Yao X, Ye S, Ma S. Transp. Lett. 2023; 15(10): 1300-1316.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Maney Publishing, Publisher Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/19427867.2022.2148068

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Focusing on the crossing scenarios of pedestrians and autonomous vehicles (AVs) at unsignalized road sections, this study proposes an evolutionary game model considering the related benefits of AVs, pedestrians and traffic managers, and it explores the impact of policy intervention. The game analysis results indicate that strategies of the three agents are closely associated with pedestrians' trust in driverless technology, human-vehicle communication and government regulation. In cases where regulation exists, increasing the AV supervision threat would facilitate the equilibrium to evolve toward pedestrians crossing and AVs yielding. In addition, we unexpectedly find that the introduction of crash probability information cannot boost the equilibrium outcomes in the expected direction, which may be related to information overload. Finally, this study verifies the validity of the model through numerical simulations and provides managerial implications with respect to driverless technology promotion, communication device design and regulatory policy formulation.

Language: en

Keywords

Autonomous vehicles; driverless technology; equilibrium analysis; government regulation; human-vehicle communication; pedestrian trust