Citation

Zhang P, Luo F. China Saf. Sci. J. 2019; 29(4): 43-50.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2019, China Occupational Safety and Health Association, Publisher Gai Xue bao)

DOI

10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2019.04.008

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In order to explore the rule of strategic choices made by safety regulators, general aviation enterprises and employees in general aviation safety supervision, an evolutionary game model of navigation safety supervision was constructed based on the conceptual model of tripartite interaction and its stability strategy was analyzed. The evolutionary game process under static and dynamic supervision strategy and external variable adjustment was simulated and analyzed by SD method. The results show that there exists a stable equilibrium solution in the supervisory system when implementing the dynamic supervisory strategy that links the safety penalty quota with the probability of violation, that the optimization of the safety supervisory system can be achieved by strengthening the intensity of accident recovery, increasing the intensity of rewards and punishments, and reducing the cost of safety realization, that the intensity of rewards and punishments within enterprises should be moderate to prevent the violation by management and operational staff in collusion, that we should lay equal stress on both accountability and process supervision, and increase the intensity and frequency of process supervision. © 2019 China Safety Science Journal

Language: zh