Citation

Chen S, Ren Y, Xi Y, Xiang L, Cui J. China Saf. Sci. J. 2022; 32(1): 51-57.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, China Occupational Safety and Health Association, Publisher Gai Xue bao)

DOI

10.16265/j.cnki.issn1003-3033.2022.01.007

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In order to explore laws of work safety behavior in firms under dynamic punishment mechanism, with costs and benefits as bases, evolution trend of enterprises' investment in safety production under different strategies was studied by using evolutionary game theory among firms in the region. The results show that when government's supervision ability is obviously restricted, a company is likely to be speculative no matter whether it is clear about safety production control target, but the government can effectively improve overall safety production level by strengthening penalties. At the same time, when firms have a clear control goal, behavior of all companies can be effectively improved by adjusting the goal reasonably. Moreover, it is found that government should not only enhance information exposure of safety production to social firms, but also reasonably determine preset goals, and punishment level, as well as actively guide the region to nurture a good initial state, so as to promote development of company groups in a good direction. © 2022, Editorial Department of China Safety Science Journal. All rights reserved.

Language: zh