Citation

Zhu Z, Liu Y, Zhang N, Peng Z. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2023; 94: e103808.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ijdrr.2023.103808

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

When responding to crises, local government leaders may face a dilemma in which public interest goals are displaced by blame avoidance for the purpose of self-protection. Studies have proposed two conflicting motivations--public service motivation (PSM) and blame avoidance motivation--to explain the cause of the blame avoidance dilemma. However, it remains unclear under what conditions and how these two motivations affect risk decision-making. Using data collected through a discrete choice survey in 2017, this study finds that 1) both PSM and operating policies can drive local government leaders to eliminate the blame avoidance dilemma in crisis times and 2) operating policies negatively moderate the relationship between PSM and the risk decisions of local government leaders. The theoretical and policy implications of crisis management are also discussed.

Language: en

Keywords

Blame avoidance dilemma; Crisis management; Operating policies; Public service motivation