Citation

Sun W, Zhu C, Li H. Int. J. Disaster Risk Reduct. 2023; 96: e103927.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.ijdrr.2023.103927

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In the initial stage of an emergency, rescue resources, such as rescuers, are often scarce, and victims at disaster sites under the condition of bounded rationality demonstrate competitive psychology in relation to the dispatch of rescue workers. Based on this, this study incorporates factors such as the bounded rationality of the disaster-stricken populations and their competitive psychology in terms of the number of rescuers into the analytical framework from the perspective of the disaster-stricken people and constructs an evolutionary game model with a multi-strategy set. The dynamic evolution process (EP) and the best rescuer dispatching scheme for each disaster site are shown through an example, and a disturbance analysis of the identified parameters is then carried out. The results reveal that the proposed rescuer dispatching model considers the multistage dynamic features of the emergency rescue process and the bounded rational game psychology among disaster sites, resulting in a more realistic dispatch scheme. For three different scenarios, such as the distance between the rescue point and the disaster site being relatively far and relatively close, and the subsequent rescue stage when the disaster situation is preliminarily alleviated, decision makers should make dispatch plans with timeliness, demand satisfaction, and comprehensive consideration of timeliness and demand satisfaction as the main decisions.

Language: en

Keywords

Bounded rationality; Evolutionary game; Rescuer dispatching; Secondary disasters