Citation

Cabral M, Cui C, Dworsky M. Am. Econ. Rev. 2022; 112(5): 1621-1668.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, American Economic Association)

DOI

10.1257/aer.20190261

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Workers' compensation insurance, which provides no-fault coverage for work-related injuries, is mandatory in nearly all states. We use administrative data from a unique market without a coverage mandate to estimate the demand for workers' compensation insurance, leveraging regulatory premium updates for identification. We find that a 1 percent increase in premiums leads to approximately a 0.3 percent decline in coverage. Drawing upon these estimates and data on costs, we examine potential justifications for government intervention to increase coverage. This analysis suggests that several forms of market failure--such as adverse selection, market power, and externalities--may not justify a mandate in this setting.

Language: en

Keywords

Actuarial Studies, Household Finance: Insurance, Safety; Forensic Economics, Labor Law; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy, Tort Law and Product Liability