Citation

Albert Z. Polit. Sci. Q. 2023; ePub(ePub): ePub.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Academy of Political Science (USA))

DOI

10.1093/psquar/qqad086

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Why do elected officials often fail to take action in line with the preferences of the majority of voters? This ambitious question sits at the heart of democratic theory; much ink has been spilled on the topic. Seth J. Hill's intervention into this field in Frustrated Majorities is all the more impressive for these reasons. Hill develops and probes a parsimonious theory that explains "frustrated majorities" as the byproduct, in part, of imbalances in issue intensity. When voters care intensely about a particular issue and engage in "costly political action" to convey that intensity to elected officials, rational office-seekers will sometimes side with a vocal and intense minority over the preferences of a less intense majority. The sure-to-be controversial implication is that antimajoritarian actions are not always a sign of democratic underperformance.

Language: en