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Journal Article

Citation

Pandit P. FMDB Trans. Sustain. Soc. Sci. Lett. 2023; 1(1): 26-42.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Fernando Martins De Bulhão Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This paper addresses the question that how much beneficence is morally obligatory. And can the principle of beneficence be practiced in its ideal sense? Morality deals with two types of ought. In its strong sense, ought prescribes such duty and obligations failures of which are morally blamable, whereas, in its weak sense, it prescribes those duties and obligations which are morally admirable but the failure of which is not morally blamable. We can say that in its strong sense ought prescribes those duties and obligations performance of which are the necessary conditions of morality for an individual. On the other hand, in its weak sense ought prescribes those duties and obligations performing of which are morally praiseworthy but the omission of which is not morally blamable. So, these duties and obligations are sufficient factors of morality but not the necessary ones. Through a detailed literature survey, this paper shows that the notion of beneficence from Utilitarian context is supererogatory in two senses. First, Utilitarianism permits too much to maximize the good for others even by imposing harm to innocent individuals which is morally unacceptable. Second, this theory often pushes the agent for maximal contribution, including maximum sacrifices to promote the overall good. The cost, the contribution, the sacrifice, no matter how costly it is for the agent, will not even count, provided it is outweighed by the benefit of others. This paper also suggests to overcome this problem by shifting the focus from the Case-specific approach to the Agent-focused approach...

Singer favours the strong sacrifice principle: "We ought to give until we reach the level of marginal utility -- that is, the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependent as I would relieve by my gift. He clarifies his point by illustrating an example where a person sees a drowning child passing by a shallow pond. According to Singer, the person should jump into the pond and save the child. By doing so, his clothes will be destroyed by the muddy water; however, this is insignificant compared to the child's death which would be worse. This principle holds two factors. First, regardless of proximity or distance, the principle applies to all. There is no moral difference between my child, my neighbour's child, and the child I do not know...


Language: en

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