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Abstract
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The problem, condition or issue
Violent radicalisation is a complex problem, complicated by the lack of a clear terrorist profile and variation in the risk factors that predict violent extremism across individuals and groups (Campelo, Oppetit, Neau, Cohen, & Bronsard, 2018; Carlsson et al., 2020; Desmarais, Simons-Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling, & Hoggan, 2017; Wolfowicz, Litmanovitz, Weisburd, & Hasisi, 2019). While models of understanding radicalisation vary (Borum, 2015; Christmann, 2012; Desmarais et al., 2017; Horgan, 2008; Koehler, 2017; Kruglanski, Bélanger, & Gunaratna, 2019; Sarma, 2017), it is broadly defined as the process by which a person adopts extremist views and moves towards committing a violent act (Irwin, 2015; Jensen, Atwell Seate, & James, 2018). Radicalisation has been linked with individual and group engagement in terrorist attacks against innocent civilians (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010), as well as individuals entering conflict zones to join formal extremist groups to engage in violent combat (Lindekilde, Bertelsen, & Stohl, 2016). As a result, radicalisation has become a key focus for counterterrorism and violence prevention interventions.
The complex and varied nature of individuals' progression from radicalisation to violence presents challenges for designing and evaluating appropriate interventions and policy responses (Hafez & Mullins, 2015; Helmus et al., 2017; Horgan & Braddock, 2010; Horgan, 2008; Jensen et al., 2018; Kruglanski et al., 2019). This level of complexity has driven national counterterrorism policy agendas to adopt intersectoral and multiagency responses that aim to address various radicalisation processes and risks (Beutel & Weinberger, 2016). These multiagency responses often involve partnerships and collaborations between various different agencies and entities (Hardy, 2018), such as governmental agencies, private businesses, community organisations and service providers.
Multiagency interventions can provide a framework for pooling and sharing resources to address a common problem (Crawford, 1999; Rosenbaum, 2002), such as radicalisation to violence. Yet they can be challenging to implement, and their effectiveness may be influenced by the quality and nature of the collaboration between agencies (see Berry, Briggs, Erol, & van Staden, 2011, for review; Atkinson, 2019; Gittell, 2006; Kelman, Hong, & Turbitt, 2013; McCarthy & O'Neill, 2014; Rosenbaum 2002). Multiagency interventions may be conceptualised on a continuum, with activities ranging from minimal collaboration to a wholistic integration of agencies and organisations (Atkinson, 2019). As a result, the outcomes of multiagency interventions may vary depending on the where the intervention falls--or is perceived to fall--on this collaborative continuum (Atkinson, 2019). Partnerships can enhance formal and informal communication, trust, respect, shared goals and knowledge (Bond & Gittell, 2010). Conversely, partnership-based interventions may highlight a number of shortcomings in service delivery including the disjointed nature of services, the need for significant stakeholder buy-in, the isolation for some of the organisations or individuals, and the resource-intensive nature of many of these collaborations (Atkinson, 2019; Bond & Gittell, 2010; Crawford, 1999; McCarthy & O'Neill, 2014; Yousanamouth, 2019). There is also the possibility that multiagency approaches could lead to adverse outcomes (Galloway, 2017; Norton, 2018). For example, multiagency responses that have poor levels of coordination and communication could lead to cases falling through the cracks where no one agency responds under the misguided assumption that another partner agency is taking the lead (Richards, 2017; Smith, Laszlo, Ayers, & Smith, 1992). Ransley (2016) also raises the possibility of increased coercion from multiagency responses. Therefore, when assessing the effectiveness and the intended outcomes of multiagency interventions, it is also important to consider the context, potential backfire effects and quality of the processes underpinning multiagency collaboration.
A broad range of agencies and experts can be involved in multiagency approaches for reducing radicalisation to violence or violent extremism (Crawford, 1999). Nevertheless, the public police are often one of the first points of contact with individuals who have radicalised to extremism. The public police are also the first point of call for those who are concerned about or report known associates, friends or family members as being at risk of radicalisation. As such, police are important partners for identifying, reducing and building resilience to radicalisation (Cherney, 2015). This review will, therefore, focus on the effectiveness of police-involved multiagency interventions for reducing radicalisation to violence and improving multiagency collaboration...
Language: en |