Citation

Egloff FJ, Shires J. Eur. J. Int. Secur. 2023; 8(1): 130-149.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2023, Cambridge University Press)

DOI

10.1017/eis.2021.20

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Transformations in state violence are intimately associated with technological capacity. Like previous era-defining technologies, global digital networks have changed state violence. Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) appear to constitute a major technological development that offers the potential for reducing state violence. This article asks: are OCCs really the better angels of our digital nature? Current scholarship in strategic studies, adopting a narrow definition of violence, conceives of OCCs as largely non-violent. This ignores how technology has given rise to new forms of harm to individuals and communities, particularly in the context of violent state repression. We propose using an expanded definition of violence, including affective and community harms, and argue that OCCs relocate, rather than reduce, state violence towards non-bodily harms. Even though their lethal effects are limited, OCCs are not, as is supposed, a non-violent addition to state arsenals. This conclusion has important implications for international affairs, including re-orienting defensive cybersecurity efforts and altering calculations around the perception of OCCs by adversaries.

Language: en

Keywords

Armed Conflict; Cyber Security; International Relations Theory; International Security; Repression; Violence