Citation

Plunkett D. Inquiry (Oslo) 2022; 65(2): 237-247.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/0020174X.2020.1828162

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In this paper, I provide a new argument in support of a concessive response to the Ravens Paradox. The argument I offer stems from Mark Schroeder's Gricean explanation for why existential judgments about normative reasons for action are unreliable. In short, I argue that Schroeder's work suggests that, in the case of the Ravens Paradox, people are running together the issue of what's assertible (in an ordinary context) about evidence with what's true about evidence. Once these issues are pulled apart, we have reason to think that the negative existential judgment about evidence that drives the Ravens Paradox is mistaken, and thus that there is in fact no paradox here at all.

Language: en

Keywords

Bayesianism; evidence; Mark Schroeder; pragmatics; The Ravens Paradox