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Citation |
Gross J, de Dreu CKW, Reddmann L. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 2022; 171: e104152. |
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Copyright |
(Copyright © 2022, Elsevier Publishing) |
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DOI |
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PMID |
unavailable |
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Abstract |
Intergroup conflict profoundly affects the welfare of groups and can deteriorate intergroup relations long after the conflict is over. Here, we experimentally investigate how the experience of an intergroup conflict influences the ability of groups to establish cooperation after conflict. We induced conflict by using a repeated attacker-defender game in which groups of four are divided into two 'attackers' that can invest resources to take away resources from the other two participants in the role of 'defenders.' After the conflict, groups engaged in a repeated public goods game with peer-punishment, in which group members could invest resources to benefit the group and punish other group members for their decisions. Previous conflict did not significantly reduce group cooperation compared to a control treatment in which groups did not experience the intergroup conflict. However, when having experienced an intergroup conflict, individuals punished free-riding during the repeated public goods game less harshly and did not react to punishment by previous attackers, ultimately reducing group welfare. This result reveals an important boundary condition for peer punishment institutions. Peer punishment is less able to efficiently promote cooperation amid a 'shadow of conflict.' In a third treatment, we tested whether such 'maladaptive' punishment patterns induced by previous conflict can be mitigated by hiding the group members' conflict roles during the subsequent public goods provision game. We find more cooperation when individuals could not identify each other as (previous) attackers and defenders and maladaptive punishment patterns disappeared. Language: en |
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Keywords |
Behavioral spill-over; Conflict; Conflict resolution; Cooperation; Punishment |