Citation

Colebrook R. Philos. Psychol. 2021; 34(5): 684-720.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/09515089.2021.1915970

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Many philosophers and psychologists have thought that people untutored in philosophy are moral realists. On this view, when people make moral judgments, they interpret their judgments as tracking universal, objective moral facts. But studies of folk metaethics have demonstrated that people have a mix of metaethical attitudes. Sometimes people think of their moral judgments as purely expressive, or as tracking subjective or relative moral facts, or perhaps no facts at all. This paper surveys the evidence for folk metaethical pluralism and argues for an explanation of this mix of folk metaethical attitudes: without philosophical education, these attitudes are typically caused by factors that are insensitive to their truth. Moreover, unless they can be justified by other means, metaethical attitudes with this etiology are, as a result, irrational, and ought not be used as evidence for or against moral realism.

Language: en

Keywords

folk metaethical; Folk Metaethics; Irrationalism; metaethical pluralism; Moral psychology; moral realism