Citation

Bshary R, Richter XYL, van Schaik C. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 2022; 377(1851): e20210150.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2022, Royal Society of London)

DOI

10.1098/rstb.2021.0150

PMID

35369754

Abstract

In many group-living mammals, philopatric females form the stable core of the group and defend food or shelter against other groups of females. Where males are larger, their participation could give their female group the edge. How can females secure the contribution of males that are neither the father of current infants, nor the dominant male expecting to sire the next generation of infants? It has been proposed that females recruit these males as 'hired guns', receiving social support and copulations in exchange for fighting, against the interests of the dominant male. We first develop the logic of this hypothesis in unprecedented detail by considering the potential pay-off consequences for females and males. We then provide empirical evidence for the existence of hired guns in this context in several primate species. The game-theoretical aspects of the phenomenon remain to be studied, as is the distribution across contexts (e.g. predation avoidance) and species of the hired gun phenomenon. This article is part of the theme issue 'Intergroup conflict across taxa'.

Language: en

Keywords

between-group competition; game theory; hired gun; paternal investment; primates; reputation-based partner choice