Citation

Haney C. Crime Delinq. 1980; 26(4): 512-527.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1980, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/001112878002600405

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Logically, it would seem that capital juries must be at least as fair, impartial, and representative as juries that sit in ordinary criminal prose cutions. But there is much evidence to suggest that this is not the case. In Witherspoon v. Illinois, the Supreme Court examined the process of "death qualification" used to impanel capital juries. The Court approved the exclusion of prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty would make it impossible for them to decide upon guilt fairly and impartially, but left open the question of whether the exclusion of others who would not consider imposing the death penalty under any circumstances violated the defendant's constitutional rights. Since Witherspoon, death qualification has been extensively studied. It has been found to affect both the composition of the jury panel that results and, through the process itself, jurors who are exposed to the procedure. The exclusion of characteristics or attitudes linked with opposition to the death penalty has meant that capital juries are unrepresentative of the community at large, predisposed to support the prosecution, and predisposed to convict persons brought before the court. The process of death qualification creates a second source of bias: Prolonged exposure to discussion of the penalty at the outset of jury qualification suggests that the defendant's guilt is presumed by the attorneys and judge, increases the acceptability of pro-death penalty attitudes, and has been shown to in crease both the likelihood that jurors will convict and their willingness to vote for the death penalty in hypothetical cases. A number of recommendations are discussed as means of creating fairness in capital juries.

Language: en