Citation

Lefebvre JA. Armed Forces Soc. 1991; 17(2): 211-227.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1991, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Over the past four decades U.S. arms transfers to Sudan have been premised on a mix of globalist and regionalist rationales. American policymakers have attempted to find a balance between containment of Soviet influence and radical regional forces in northeast Africa with a desire not to unnecessarily antagonize Egypt, the most influential Arab state which has a vital stake in Sudan. Since the mid-1970s these two objectives have been largely congruent. U.S. support for Sudan has been seen as a means to enhance the security of Egypt and, thereby, maintain the pro-U.S. policy of Cairo. Except for a brief time in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Washington hoped to replace its lost position of influence in the Horn of Africa via the development of a close political-military relationship with the government of Jaafar Nimieri, Sudan, in and of itself, has been of little direct consequence to the United States, simply a potential domino. As a result the "local" situation in Sudan has been susceptible to distortion by U.S. policymakers who are either obsessed with containing "so-called" radical forces in the region or placating Cairo, or both.

Language: en