Citation

Kröller A, Hüffner F, Kosma, Kröller K, Zeni M. Transp. Res. Rec. 2021; 2675(11): 44-53.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2021, Transportation Research Board, National Research Council, National Academy of Sciences USA, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/03611981211006426

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Strategic Routing is a traffic intervention mechanism. To reduce traffic in a certain area, drivers are asked to take a pre-defined route diverting them from the area, even though this increases their travel time. This can be implemented with navigation apps or in-dash navigation from navigation service providers such as TomTom or Google. Triggered by a traffic authority, the driver receives information through the service provider's infrastructure and user interface about a new route and potentially a reward. In this work, we investigate the dynamics between traffic authority, service provider, and end user by analyzing user expectations. Ultimately, service providers are competing for customers. They can, therefore, only implement strategic routing if it appeals to drivers rather than scares them away. We report on the insights of a two-stage study with 457 participants, exploring what kind of strategic routing interventions are appreciated by drivers. We find that drivers report a high interest in seeing diversion suggestions, even when they are not inclined to take them. However, they are unwilling to have their route adapted automatically. Important factors affecting drivers' willingness to divert are the reason for the detour and the additional driving time. Incentives do increase the efficacy, but only marginally increase user appreciation, indicating that users may mistrust strategic routing that relies too strongly on incentives.

Language: en