Citation

de Gramatica M, Massacci F, Shim W, Turhan U, Williams J. Risk Anal. 2017; 37(2): 372-395.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2017, Society for Risk Analysis, Publisher John Wiley and Sons)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article reports on a study undertaken to evaluate agency costs in aviation security. The authors combined results from a quantitative economic model with a qualitative study they conducted using semi-structured interviews. This new model extends previous principal-agent models by combining the traditional fixed and varying monetary responses to physical and cognitive effort with nonmonetary welfare and potentially transferable value of employees' own human capital. The authors completed an extensive interview process with regulators, airport managers, security personnel, and those tasked with training security personnel, all of whom were involved with an airport operating in a relatively high-risk state, Turkey. These interviews provided empirical evidence for the tradeoffs identified in the quantitative model. The study found that the effectiveness of additional training depends on the mix of "transferable skills" and "emotional" buy-in of the security agents. The authors recommend that principals identify on which side of a critical tipping point their security personnel are to ensure that additional training, with attached expectations of the burden of work, aligns the incentives of employees with the principals' own objectives.

Keywords

Training; Employees; Security; Stakeholders; Turkey; Aviation safety; Airport operations; Terrorism